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ABSTRACT
This article aims to investigate the possible role of agriculture with regard to
poverty alleviation and development. It focuses more specifically on the problem
of numerous smallholder farming families, who currently fail to get access to
well and fair functioning market services and as a result get caught in the poverty
trap and even face starvation. With reference to the framework of Transaction
Costs Economy (TCE), it will be argued that market- and state failure are among
the causes of this problem and that it is not likely to be solved through further
liberalisation and more competition in global agricultural markets. A possible
solution lies in state and other actors’support for the development of markets and
institutions that effectively support agriculture growth and strengthen the farm-
ers’ bargaining power. 
The first sections will briefly describe rural poverty and the bottlenecks to
agricultural development. 
Next is an elaboration on the concept “globalisation” and the differing eco-
nomic views on globalisation and rural development. Finally, recommendations
are made for policy changes.
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Vredeseilanden, LeuvenI.SMALLHOLDER FARMERS’ POVERTY, AND AGRICULTURAL
DEVELOPMENT AS A WAY OUT
Ample figures illustrate that poverty is the major global challenge of
the 21st century, and reducing poverty was rightly one of the main
commitments made at the millennium conference1 . More than 1.2 bil-
lion people have to survive on less than one euro per day, and they
live mainly in South Asia (40%) and Sub-Saharan Africa (30%).
Poverty goes hand in hand with hunger, of the 800 million chroni-
cally undernourished, 65% live in Asia and 23 % in Sub-Saharan
Africa. In Asia, the situation gradually improves, but in Africa it wors-
ens and at the current pace the objective of halving their number by
2015 will not be achieved. 
For the public opinion it may be hard to believe that the victims of
poverty and hunger often live in farming families, yet poverty and
hunger are mainly a rural phenomenon. Estimates range from 62% to
75% (Pinstrup-Andersen et al. (2001); IFAD (2001)) and only by 2035
the urban poor may outnumber their rural counterparts. The entitle-
ment-theory (Sen (1970)) is an interesting framework to understand
this. An “entitlement” can be understood as an alternative package of
goods which a person can acquire. In an often-cited example, Sen
compares two farmers who grow 10 kg of rice, but farmer Ahas access
to a market where 2.5 kg of rice can be exchanged for 1 kg of beef,
farmer B lives far from a marketplace. So farmer A has the entitle-
ments [(10 kg of rice), (5 kg of rice, 2 kg of beef)], whereas farmer
B can only enjoy [(10 kg of rice)]. At first sight they have the same
income, but in fact farmer A has more options or “entitlements”. 
The story shows the importance of access to market services which
function well, i.e. which offer farmers the best possible price for their
products. If the farmers live in marginal conditions and are confronted
with poverty- and food crises, there is a serious chance that finally they
will both move to that city.
This approach allows to understand as well why especially in Africa
nomadic cattle owners (pastoralists) are often even worse off, com-
pared to staple food growers. Indeed, pastoralists will be negatively
affected by an increase of the price of the staple food crop such as rice,
e.g. in times of drought. As they need to trade beef for rice as part of
their consumption basket, and often live far away from a market, the
exchange can become very difficult for them. They have often no
chance to move to the city, as they depend entirely on pastures for
642their cattle and income or the government does not allow them to
move. In times of famine, they are often the first to starve. In some
cases, civil society organisations such as Ilarmatak Lokonerei, a Masai
organisation in Tanzania assist pastoralists to diversify into cropping
activities in order to improve their income without completely giving
up their culture (Vredeseilanden (2002)). But in the case of pastoral-
ists, or other groups who don’t produce the staple food, too high sta-
ple food prices will reduce their food security. They would for instance
benefit from cheap rice imports (as is the case in Tanzania). Further
down in this article, it will be argued that cheap food imports under-
mine food security, as in poor agrarian societies such imports decrease
the income of farmers who have to rely on agriculture. The pastoral-
ist example shows how important it is to analyse the kind of income
farmers have, and challenges us to disentangle the complex effects
food- and agricultural policies e.g. related to price setting and imports
have on different groups in society. However, as many rural poor try
to produce crops such as maize for own consumption and for the mar-
ket, the “food price dilemma” is a major challenge for many govern-
ments in developing countries. If the food price is too high, the poor-
est groups in society will become food insecure and even a political
threat if the urban poor are involved (food riots). But if the prices are
too low, the rural population will impoverish and move to the city. 
The reason behind such rural-urban migration is that city-dwellers,
even if they are poor, usually have more options (entitlements) in their
struggle to make a living. Evidence from research in Tanzania con-
firms this (Katuli (2003)): “The rural populations are shrinking, by
areas at least. The share of the total population that was urban grew
from 6% in 1967 to 14% in 1978 and 21% in 1988, according to the
population censuses of those years. Tanzania has one of the highest
rates of urbanization in Sub-Saharan Africa: the urban population
increased by 53% between 1978 and 1988, with an even higher growth
rate of 57% on the mainland. The rural-urban migration reflects the
movement of thousands of young women and men away from the
countryside to towns in search of better opportunities in employment,
education and access to social services. The majority are absorbed in
the informal sector, but a growing number of women and youth find
employment on plantations and large farms. The search for better
opportunities is the other side of the deterioration of smallholder agri-
culture as a result of counter-reform policies which have undermined
the capacity of smallholder farm households to sustain themselves.” 
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rural  areas  is  economic:  low  rural  incomes,  economic  hardship,
scarcity of arable land, especially for women and youth, and the desire
for non-farm employment conditions. Oppressive and exploitative
relations within smallholder farming have become especially intoler-
able. Most of the husbands are the first ones to move to urban areas
in search for jobs, which results in shrinkage of the rural population.
Thus, it leads to family separation and contributes to the spreading of
HIV/AIDS pandemic.
In a next step, people tend to move out of their country. Kydd, Dor-
ward and Vaughan (2002) suggest as one of the solutions to increase
the national income of Malawi “a large scale movement of people
out of that country into less densely populated areas in other coun-
tries”. Similar own observations in Senegal and Spain confirm this in
a dramatic way. During field visits in the Casamance area, a 10 year
old boy told us proudly that later he would go to earn money in
Europe, just like his big brother. The brother had left two years ago,
they had not heard of him ever since. The mother did not speak but
fear showed in her eyes. Later that summer a Spanish rescue diver
who had spent a whole day diving for the bodies of illegal immigrants
who died when trying to cross the Strait of Gibraltar was crying to the
TV cameras: “They are so many down there, all dead. This should be
made known and solved in a human way.” The Spanish economy ben-
efits from cheap illegal migrant labour, but Spain nor Europe manage
to handle the issue of economic migration.
Another solution for countries like Malawi and Tanzania is the devel-
opment of technologies that raise maize or other food crop production
without the need of imported inputs (Kydd, Dorward and Vaughan
(2002)). Vredeseilanden and many other NGO’s and farmer organisa-
tions hold the same view and promote Low External Sustainable Agri-
culture and agro-ecology as a way out of poverty and food insecurity.
If they are to benefit the poor, agricultural technologies should be cheap
in the first place, and therefore rely as much as possible on the locally
available knowledge and resources. They should allow rural people to
valorise their manual labour, bearing in mind that out of the 1.3 billion
farmers on this planet, more than 900 million labour their land manu-
ally, 350 million have access to animal draft power, and only 30 mil-
lion (3%) use a tractor (Belgische Boerenbond (2003)). 
Above all, innovative technologies should be productive in order to
help rural poor emerge from the so-called poverty trap (Dorward and
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of market demand and marketed produce; the low market activity leads
to high marketing costs and risks, which hamper market development;
as a result agricultural input supply, produce markets and finance remain
at a low level, and farmers and traders shy away from the risks involved
in economic interaction, … a typical case of market failure. 
II.THE STATE AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF MARKETS AND
INSTITUTIONS THAT SUPPORTAGRICULTURAL GROWTH
Apart from natural shocks (drought) and price risks related to poor
roads and communications, also the lack of economic coordination
and opportunism pose serious risks to those involved in the rural econ-
omy. Economic players face serious coordination risks when invest-
ing in the supply chain, they can go bankrupt if other players refuse
to  make  a  complementary  investment.  The  risk  of  opportunism
involves self-interest seeking with guile, such as selective or distorted
information disclosure and occurs especially if there are weak insti-
tutions protecting contractors. There are numerous examples of traders
taking advantage of the lack of price information to cheat farmers,
and of farmers who break the contract with a trader when they can get
a higher price from another one. 
Those risks are not easily overcome through the market mechanism.
Neo-classical economic theory has difficulties to explain how eco-
nomic transactions can take place under imperfect market conditions.
Since the 1960s other economic theories have been formulated which
are complementary to the standard neo-classical theory. They are
called “new institutional economics”, due to their focus on the role of
institutions (firms, market institutions) in the coordination of economic
transactions. In this strand of economic theory, Williamson (1975) has
spearheaded the development of the Transaction Cost Economy (TCE)
theory. In developed economies, TCE is increasingly used to study
how economic actors form organisations and make contracts to reduce
the transaction costs involved in guaranteeing food safety and specific
quality (Verhaegen (2001); Vannoppen (2002)). Dorward et al. (1998)
propose to use TCE to analyse and search solutions to limit the costs
associated with the risks related to economic coordination and oppor-
tunistic  behaviour  in  the  often  “thin  markets”  of  developing
economies. To tackle these problems that hamper market access and
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indicates that institutions are needed, fitted in a framework which
Kydd, Dorward and Poulton (2002) call “Coordinated Market Econ-
omy” (CME). These authors suggest a rethinking of the roles of the
state, producer organizations and other actors such as traders. Thereby
the state and other powerful actors can initiate asset-specific invest-
ments (e.g. a maize mill) and take a lead in encouraging the develop-
ment of deliberative institutions inside a sector and vertically along the
supply  chain.  This  is  different  from  Liberal  Market  Economies
(LMEs), in which competition in the market and formal contracting
provide the economic transactors with a sufficient basis (e.g. on prod-
uct quality, quantities, delivery time, ...) to exchange goods and ser-
vices. Without denying the role of economic coordination based on
market relations and price, in CMEs more emphasis is on non-market
and non contractual relations to coordinate efforts and to construct
core competencies. Coordination among economic transactors can for
instance be civic i.e. based on a set of collective principles which they
adhere to, structuring their economic relations accordingly and mak-
ing a collective commitment to avoid conflicts. In this set-up the actors
try to realise a common good or aim, for which they are prepared to
reduce their own interests. Fair Trade supply networks are a good
example of such civic coordination. In other cases, the coordination
is domestic, i.e. based on a face to face relationship and on personal
trust established in previous transactions. This happens for instance at
farm gate shops and farmers’ markets, where the producer can inter-
act directly with their often very loyal consumers. In Europe, theorists
of the Economic Conventions school (Boltanski and Thévenot (1991);
Sauvée (1998)) have studied in depth the role of civic and domestic
coordination in marketing initiatives for specific quality food, espe-
cially when quality is related to intangible product characteristics such
as the social or ecological sustainability of the production system.
Thereby, they propose a CME approach and insist that the State should
play a role (Sylvander (1995); Valceschini and Polin (1999)).
An example of how a CME approach works in a developing coun-
try reality is given by D’Haese et al. (2002), in a research on small-
holder wool production in the former Transkei homeland. She found
that the collective exploitation of a shearing shed and marketing of
wool contributes to institutional innovation, whereby working hori-
zontally amongst farmers lowers market barriers and transaction costs,
and vertical coordination improves market efficiency. 
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GLOBAL TRADE LIBERALIZATION POLICIES 
In agrarian dominated economies, growth in agriculture plays a cru-
cial role to kick-off the socio-economic development process (John-
ston and Mellor (1961)). At that stage the agricultural sector can bring
in necessary elements for successful development of the newly emerg-
ing sectors, such as labour, capital, and of course food for the work-
ing class and domestic demand for the goods which those workers
manufacture. Powerful examples corroborate this thesis: vibrant agri-
cultural sectors were at the basis of the industrial revolution in Europe,
the US, the Asian Tigers. 
Surprisingly, in recent years, Western development experts have
tended to doubt the validity of the Johnston-Mellor theory. They seem
to believe that thanks to globalisation, the initial demand for products
of a developing countries’infant industry and services can come from
abroad, and that depending on the comparative advantage on the
global playing field, other sectors than agriculture can be the motor for
development (Koning (2002)). The combination of opening of markets
and reduction of state intervention is commonly known as the Wash-
ington Consensus on Agriculture (WCA), and has been strongly pro-
moted by the IMF, World Bank and WTO. 
Koning disagrees with this view and advocates for policy changes in
order to address the “agrarian malaise”, and Irz et al. (2002) have identi-
fied twelve good reasons to believe that agricultural growth can reduce
poverty at the farm level, in the rural economy and nationally. Kydd, Dor-
ward and Poulton (2002) conclude: “the WCA is trying to impose LME
institutions on poor rural areas, whereas what is needed is an evolution
in a more CME direction. Or in other words: an Anglo-Saxon model is
being pushed, whereas elements of the European/Asian institutional model
could be more helplful”. … One could add “…to give the rural poor
opportunities to enter the market economy”. For them, the LME-alterna-
tive is not attractive at all: not investing in agricultural innovation will
keep millions of rural people in the aforementioned poverty trap.
Research in Tanzania confirms it (Katuli (2003)):
Marketing liberalisation has increased the number of private traders
who operate in the countryside, thus provided additional motivation
for farmers to produce more food, at least in those areas which are
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tion centres. However, major constraints have been identified by Mar-
keting Development Boards (MDB) which reduce the returns avail-
able  to  women  and  men  smallholder  farmers.  Markets  have  the
problems of:
 Absence of buying centres and few traders at village level, thus reduc-
ing competition among buyers and creating a buyers market instead
 Traders’insistence to use volume unit measures rather than with weights,
which leads to cheating on prices
 Absence of a perfect grading system, thereby reducing the incentive to
maintain quality output
 Impossibility of collecting lawful levies and information under present
market conditions
These problems can be solved through: technological innovation;
prices and interests rates that make agriculture profitable; marketing
institutions  that  improve  the  coordination  and  reliability  of  the
demand-supply (trader-farmer) interaction and that prevent and sanc-
tion opportunistic behaviour; improved roads and communications
(Dorward and Kydd (2002)). 
International policy evolutions are however not conducive for those
who want to tackle the problems. Industrialised countries continue to
subsidise agricultural exports and by doing so depress world market
prices for agricultural produce. At the same time, developing countries
are increasingly denied the right to protect their home markets. More-
over the policy space and international financial support for rural and
agricultural development are shrinking. 
This is illustrated by the positions in the WTO negotiations on fur-
ther liberalisation of the agricultural sector, which should lead to a
new Agreement on Agriculture (AoA) by the end of 2004. The nego-
tiations are completely stuck however, no agreement seems to be pos-
sible on the draft agreement proposed by Stuart Harbison, the chair-
man of the AoA negotiations. 
Up till now, developing countries aspirations have been largely
pushed aside in the negotiations. The liberalisation is basically in three
domains, and in all three developing countries are not heard or put
under pressure. The issues at stake are presented below along with
policy proposals from the Belgian Development en environmental
NGO’s and the trade unions. 
More free export competition: export subsidies. In WTO there is
agreement that export subsidies are due to diminish, but only slowly.
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petition on their national and regional markets. Proposals of devel-
oping countries for a food security mechanism, which would allow
them to impose import tariffs in order to protect their agricultural
sector against cheap food imports, have not survived the negotiation
process.  By  continuing  to  use  the  export  subsidy  tool,  the  EU
increases the divide and mistrust with developing nations. By doing
so, the EU misses opportunities to build alliances with the South and
to demonstrate them that we are really serious about coherence
between development policies and trade policies. Some argue that
export subsidies are negligible. If that is the case, it can’t be diffi-
cult to scrap them altogether. Of course the subsidies should not be
replaced by other export-promoting payments. Proposal in the Can-
cun-statement of Belgian development, environmental and trade
union organizations: 
Direct  and  indirect  support  to  agricultural  exports  have  to  be
scrapped. The remaining subsidies have to be reoriented towards sus-
tainable rural development through fighting poverty, improving work-
ers’ conditions, and the promotion of animal welfare and ecological
sustainability.
A. Market access
Market access can be reduced by quantitative restrictions, non-tariff
barriers (e.g. hormone beef can not enter the EU) and tariffs. In the
WTO it is now proposed to have only tariff barriers, and to gradu-
ally reduce the levels of those. Developing countries too have to
reduce tariffs, be it at slower pace and lower percentage. The least
developed countries were forced to agree not to increase their tariffs.
So, all in all, the reduction comes, even if it concerns crops of vital
importance to their food security. As already pointed out, the call for
the right to protection from cheap imports has been brushed aside by
those nations who want more access to developing countries’ mar-
kets. Industrialised countries made one concession: they accepted to
draft a list of “special crops”, if it can be shown to be of vital impor-
tance to food security and livelihoods in a given country, it will be
allowed a smaller tariff reduction. This will be subject to new tough
negotiations of course. One wonders, if those crops are so special,
why not leave the tariffs in place or even increase them? (Answer:
649WTO is about liberalisation, so there is no way to talk about main-
taining or increasing protection levels). Position in the Cancun-state-
ment of Belgian development, environmental and trade union orga-
nizations: 
In order to protect themselves from cheap imports, countries, espe-
cially developing countries, must have possibilities to impose import-
reducing measures such as tariffs and quantitative restrictions. Rich
countries should give regulated and preferential market access to
developing countries.
B. Domestic support
Over the past years, developing countries and NGO’s have been lob-
bying at the WTO for a so-called “development box”. The argument
is clear: If industrialised countries have their boxes (amber, green,
blue) filled with measures that exempt them from liberalising, or that
allow them to continue subsidising, then developing countries too
should have a box for their interests. In it would be so-called “pref-
erential and differential treatment” measures, giving room for support
to the local and regional efforts for rural development and food secu-
rity. Reaction of Belgian development, environmental and trade union
organizations: 
The remaining subsidies have to be reoriented towards sustainable
rural development through fighting poverty, improving workers’con-
ditions, and the promotion of animal welfare and ecological sustain-
ability.
In the domestic support chapter the “non-trade concerns” get spe-
cific attention, e.g. measures to promote fair trade, artisan and regional
production, environment. Marketing initiatives and labels that allow
consumers to contribute to the realisation of such concerns are con-
sidered unfair competition by some in the WTO negotiations. Vrede-
seilanden posits an opposing view. 
The MISSION of agricultural, rural, food- and trade policies should
be: to produce sufficient good quality food for its population, whilst
respecting the own culture and social fabric, the workers rights, the
environment, the animal welfare. 
650IV.CONCLUSION
States and regions such as the EU, the Economic Community of West
African States (ECOWAS), have the obligation to take a lead in real-
ising the mission of food security for their citizens. Thereby, global
(inter-regional) trade is useful and necessary, e.g. to buy additional
supplies or to sell surpluses. But Vredeseilanden strongly rejects the
“export mission” concept, which some in the EU and the US still hold.
The current US president for instance recently stated “I would like to
see our farmers feed the world and I will work hard to open up mar-
kets”. However, shipping cheap food to developing countries is not a
sustainable solution. Cheap as it is, the estimated 700 million rural
poor face the risk of not having the money to buy that food, since
they have to rely on agriculture for a major part of their income. In
fact they are likely to have less income, because cheap imports have
a depressing effect on the local producer prices. Instead, rich countries
could assist governments of developing countries to stimulate local
food production through market development and institutions that
effectively support agricultural growth. By doing so, rich countries
would help bringing new livelihood to rural families.
NOTES
1. More info on: www.un.org/millennium/declaration/ares552e.htm, www.undp.org/mdg/
goalsandindicators.html, www.fao.org/worldfoodsummit.
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